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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIrm's Norm-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

ATTORNEY

FEES-CONTRACT

FOR-NOT

SEVERABLE-No.

12,577-Mutter vs. Burgess and Adams. Decided June 23,
1930.
Facts.-The plaintiffs, a law firm, were employed by the
defendant to defend him in an Alienation of Affections suit.
The written contract of employment provided for a retainer
of $1,000. Of this amount, $200 had been paid, and this suit
was brought for the balance. Before the determination of
the Alienation of Affections suit, the defendant accused the
plaintiffs of selling him out, and he also made other similarly
violent remarks concerning the plaintiffs' conduct in, the case.
The plaintiffs promptly withdrew, and brought this action
on the contract. The question presented is whether an attorney, who has withdrawn from a case before he has fully performed his contract, can recover his full fee. The trial court
gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
Held.-(1) In withdrawing, they did what any self-respecting lawyers would have done.
(2) Defendant's contention that the plaintiffs could not
sue on the contract, but should have sued on a quantum meruit,
or for damages for the breach of the contract was without
merit. Contracts of attorneys are exceptions to the rule that
an "employe can recover only the difference between what he
received or might have received from others and the price
agreed upon."
"One reason for the exception is that such service is not easily partible
or apportioned to the time or the labor performed or to be performed by the
attorney. Another reason is that often the most difficult and valuable services
of the attorney to his client are rendered in advising him of his legal rights
before any papers are prepared or appearances made in court. Another is
that by the contract the attorney loses the possible opportunity of employment by the adversary party."

Judgment Affirmed.

DICTA
ACCIDENT INSURANCE-BODILY INJURIES-EVIDENCE-No.

12263-Bickes vs. The Travelers Insurance Company-Decided April 14, 1930.
Facts.-Margaret Bickes brought this action against The
Travelers Insurance Company for $10,000 on an accident insurance policy issued to her husband, Roy W. Bickes. The
evidence showed that plaintiff and the decedent had been
married for six years; that decedent was in good health; that
on October 1, 1927, he was in Trinidad, Colorado on business
and telephoned plaintiff saying that he would be home in a
few days; that about a week later he came home with a bump
on his forehead, elbows badly skinned, clothes soiled, etc. The
attending physician testified that decedent was irrational; that
he had an abrasion on the forehead which was, in his opinion,
the result of an external cause. Other physicians testified
similarly. At the end of the plaintiff's testimony the trial
court granted a nonsuit.
Held.-The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, and
it was proper to admit the testimony of the physicians that in
their opinion the injuries resulted from an external cause.
Judgment Reversed.
CANCELLATION
DENCE-No.

OF

DEED-CONDITIONAL

DELIVERY-Evi-

12,258-The American National Bank, Administrator,Substituted for Mary E. Elwood, Deceased,Vs.
John L. Silverthorn-DecidedApril 28, 1930.
Facts.-Mary E. Elwood, during her lifetime lived with
her daughter, Martha, and Martha's husband, the defendant
here. In 1919 Elwood executed a warranty deed purporting
to convey to Martha certain real property. Thereafter Martha
conveyed to defendant here. A little later Martha died and
Elwood began this suit to set aside both the deed from her to
Martha and the deed from Martha to defendant, alleging that
the deed from her to Martha was delivered conditionally with
the express agreement that delivery was not to become effective until Elwood's death, and then only in case Martha survived her. The complaint also alleged that defendant knew
the conditions of the delivery. The trial court found, as a
matter of fact, that the delivery from Elwood to Martha was
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DICTA

not conditional, and judgment was entered in favor of defendant.
Held.-There is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the lower court which, therefore, will not be disturbed.

Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-NO. 12368-People vs. Mooney. Decided

June 23, 1930.
Facts.-The defendant was charged with violation of
Sec. 3740 C. L. 1921 which provides that:
"This chapter shall extend to and include all theatres, circuses and
shows, where an admission fee is charged for entrance thereto. No person shall
be allowed by virtue of any such license to open any place of public amusement, such as a theatre, circus or show, on the Sabbath or Lord's day; but any
person who shall so offend on such a day shall be fined in a sum * * *."

The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts and the
court dismissed the action.
Held.-"We would be violating one of the well recognized rules of
construction if we held that the statute applies to those who fail to procure
a license as well as to the licensees, because the language used in the statute
itself is applicable to those only who procure licenses, and those who violate
other provisions of the statute by failing to procure a license, might open
their theatres on the Sabbath or Lord's day, without fear of punishment.
This leads to a ridiculous and absurd conclusion, amounting to punishment
for one who honestly endeavors to comply strictly with every provision of the
statute, and a reward to the one who violates it.
"Before the defendant can be adjudged guilty, it is incumbent upon
the People to specify some particular act committed in violation of a public
law, either forbidding or commanding it. The statute under consideration
does not forbid the opening of a theatre on the Sabbath or Lord's day, and
the defendant has not violated any express provision of the statute. We are
unable to determine exactly what the legislature intended in passing this
section of the statute, with a violation of which this defendant is charged.
The statute under consideration is indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous; * * *"
CRIMINAL LAW-PRIOR CONVICTION-EvIDENCE-No.

12350

-Noble 0. Hamilton vs. The People of the State of Colorado-DecidedApril 21, 1930.
Facts.-The evidence indicated that defendant Hamilton
was engaged with others in a confidence game whereby it was

DICTA

attempted to defraud a savings and loan company of a large
sum of money. Defendant brought error alleging that he was
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
and also on the ground that it was improperly brought out
at the trial that defendant and one Stone had been in the
penitentiary at the same time.
Held.-1. There is no rule that one accused of a crime
may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. 2. There was evidence indicating that defendant and Stone had conspired in the penitentiary to work out
this fraud and it was, therefore, proper to show that they were
both in the penitentiary.
Insofar as this opinion is contrary to the decision in Ryan
vs. People, 66 Colorado 208; 180 Pacific 84, the earlier case
is overruled.
Judgment Affirmed.
To SET ASIDE-GROUNDS
FOR-No. 12,514-Connell vs. Continental Casualty Company et al. Decided June 23, 1930.
Facts.-One Cunningham was granted compensation by
the Industrial Commission against Connell and the Casualty
Company. The Company sought a review in the District
Court. Though properly served, Connell failed to appear and
judgment was entered against him by default. The District
Court held that the insurance policy did not cover Cunningham's injury, and the Commission was directed to dismiss as
to the Casualty Company. The policy covered only those employees of Connell that worked in his home in Denver. Cunningham was injured while building a cabin for Connell at
Indian Hilts. Connell had been told by the insurance agent
that he was covered on his risk at Indian Hills before the
work was begun there. However, the proper entry had not
been made on the records of the Company. Connell, by this
action, seeks to set aside the default judgment, and his petition
to set aside was denied.
Held.-Without deciding what relief Connell has
against the Casualty Company because of the unkept promise
of its agent,
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS-PETITION

DICTA
(1) "Applications to vacate default judgments are addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court,"

and its decision will only be set aside when that discretion
has been abused.
(2) "To entitle a party to have a default judgment set aside for the
reasons assigned in this case, it must appear, not only that the default and
judgment were obtained by fraud, mistake, inadvertance, or excusable neglect,
but that prima facie there is a meritorious defense."

Judgment affirmed.
WHEN-No. 12,197-Sherman
Mercantile Company vs. Mountain Ice and Coal Company
and The Jagger Produce Company. Decided June 23,
1930.
Facts.-Action to recover the possession of eggs which
were stored by the plaintiff. The action was dismissed as to
the Mountain Ice and Coal Company by stipulation. The
plaintiff's evidence showed that the defendant secured merchandise consisting of 327 cases of eggs, after having procured
a merchandise order in favor of one Richards, from one
Davidson, an employe of the plaintiff who, at the time, stated
that he had no authority to sign for the plaintiff. Previously,
the defendant had secured two orders from Richards, who was
indebted to the defendant, for the delivery of 51 cases of eggs
which were in storage for Richards. These two orders were
left blank so that the defendant could take them in such quantities as they might wish. Defendant then used one of the
orders given him by Richards (for the 51 cases owned by
Richards) and made it out for the 327 cases for which the
unauthorized order to Richards from the plaintiff provided.
Defendant tlhen gave Richards credit on his account for the
327 cases. The entire transaction was repudiated by the
plaintiff and by Richards when they learned of it, and the
warehouse was given instructions not to turn the eggs over
to the defendant. Plaintiff then brought this action and the
court directed a verdict for the defendant.
DIRECTED VERDICT-ERROR

Held.-"There was ample evidence to carry the case to the jury. It
was the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to the testimony."

Reversed.

DICTA
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PURCHASE OF TAx CERTIFICATEINJUNCTION-NO. 12,225-Louis Werner vs. Eugene A.

Norden, et al-Decided April 28, 1930.
Facts.-Werner, the owner of the fee title to a lot in
Cripple Creek, brought an action alleging that Norden was
his tenant; that defendant Sennett conspired with Norden to
secure the assignment of a tax sale certificate, and thereby to
obtain for Norden a tax deed to the lot. The complaint prayed
for an injunction against the County Treasurer to prevent him
from issuing such tax deed, and offering to pay the amount
due under the tax sale certificate. The defendants' answer
made no proper denials of the pertinent facts in the complaint. After the filing of the complaint, before the trial of
the cause, the Treasurer issued the tax deed to Sennett. The
lower court refused to grant plaintiff the relief which he
prayed for on the ground that the tax deed had already been
issued at the time of the trial, and that the question attempted
to be litigated by the plaintiff was moot.
Held.-A tenant may not either alone or in conspiracy
with any other person obtain the paramount title to land which
he holds in his capacity as tenant. The issuance of the tax
deed after the institution of the suit did not render the question
moot, but, on the other hand, such deed was of necessity subject
to the result of the litigation which had been started. The
plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to his injunction.
Judgment Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
12218
-Daly vs. Lininger-DecidedApril 7, 1930.
Facts.-Daly, plaintiff below, sued Lininger, defendant
below, for damages for malpractice. The testimony shows
that Lininger operated on plaintiff's jaw; that during the
operation there was a hemorrhage causing such a flow of blood
that Lininger could not see clearly what he was doing, and as
a result the left inferior dental nerve was severed. The lower
court instructed the jury among other things, that the question
of whether Lininger had used reasonable skill and diligence
should be decided only from a preponderance of the evidence
MALPRACTICE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-EVIDENCE-No.

D ICTA
of the expert witnesses. The plaintiff objected to this instruction and asked the court to instruct the jury that this was one
of the class of cases in which the jury should be guided by
the common experience of mankind as well as by the testimony
of experts. Defendant also counterclaimed for the reasonable
value of his services, but the plaintiff in her replication denied
that there was anything due on account of such services. The
lower court directed a verdict for defendant on the counterclaim and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
on plaintiff's complaint for damages.
Held.-The lower court erred in instructing the jury, and
the question of negligence should not be determined solely by
the testimony of expert witnesses. It was also error to direct
a verdict for the defendant on the cross complaint when the
pleadings showed that the plaintiff had denied that there was
anything due.
Judgment Reversed and a New Trial Ordered.
12266
-Bessie M. Sipes vs. L. E. Sipes, et al-Decided April 21,
1930.
Facts.-DaisyW. Sipes, the owner of a note and deed of
trust executed by Bessie M. Sipes, died leaving as her heirs at
law the defendants, L. E. Sipes, et al. The plaintiff sued L. E.
Sipes individually and all of the defendants as heirs at law,
setting forth that they were the owners of the note; that plaintiff agreed with L. E. Sipes as administrator and as agent for
the other defendants that the note and trust deed were to be
returned to plaintiff and that plaintiff was to convey the land
secured thereby to defendants. It appears that two of the
defendants are minors. The complaint prayed that if it
should be found that L. E. Sipes was the agent for the other
defendants, a reconveyance of the realty should be ordered.
If it should be found that he was not such agent, complaint
prayed for damages against him individually. The lower
court sustained the demurrer to the complaint.
Held.-The demurrer was properly sustained. To reconvey was a joint obligation. The minors involved could not
be bound through a supposed agent, therefore, none of the
MINOR'S CONTRACTS-AGENT-JOINT CONTRACT-NO.

DICTA

defendants could be bound. There is no cause of action here
against L. E. Sipes personally as an agent acting beyond the
scope of his authority in presuming to deal for the minors
because there is no statement in the complaint that the plaintiff
was ignorant of the minority of two of the defendants.
Judgment Affirmed.
NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL

INJURY-PROXIMATE

CAUSE-No.

12262-Stout, an infant, by O'Connell, his next friend vs.
Denver Park and Amusement Company-Decided April
14, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff, aged 19, was riding in a roller
coaster car belonging to defendant. Plaintiff testified that
during the course of the ride he was struck on the head by
some unknown object. He was not strapped in the car at the
time. He fell out of the car, was dragged along the track and
finally managed to get back into the car. In the course of the
fall he suffered an injury and brought this action to recover
damages from the defendant company alleging that its failure
to see that he was strapped in the car was the proximate cause
of the injury. The lower court entered a directed verdict for
the defendant.
Held.-In the absence of conflicting testimony, the
determination of the proximate cause was for the court. Defendant's failure to see that plaintiff was strapped in the car
was not the proximate cause, either alone or in conjunction
with the blow which plaintiff received on the head.
Judgment Affirmed.
PERSONAL

INJURY-NEGLIGENCE-ASSUMPTION

OF RISK-

No. 12386-Denver and Salt Lake Railway Company vs.
Lombardi-DecidedApril 21, 1930.
Facts.-Lombardi brought this action for damages alleging that he was a foreman for the Denver and Salt Lake Railway Company; that certain blasting operations were being
carried on; that he stationed one Quintano to warn him of the
fall of any rocks; that Quintano did not warn him of the fall
of a rock which struck him and injured him. Quintano and

DICTA

another laborer both testified that Quintano had shouted at
the approach of the rock which injured plaintiff. Defendant
alleged that plaintiff had assumed the risk incident to the
operations in which he was engaged at the time of the accident.
Held.-Under the facts in this case the risks were not
assumed because they were not fully known and appreciated.
Judgment Affirmed.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

COMMISSION-FINDING

OF

FACT By-

ANTI-DUPLICATION ACT-No. 12,254-Utilities Commis-

sion et al vs. City of Loveland.
Facts.-This action is actually between the City and the
Public Service Company, each of which claims the exclusive
right to furnish certain territory adjacent to the City with
electricity. Under the socalled anti-duplication law, the Company filed a petition complaining that the defendant was in
the course of constructing an electric line over territory
already occupied by the Company. The City answered that
no certificate was necessary because the territory in dispute
was contiguous to its own lines, and was not already served
by the Company. The Commission sustained the Company's
petition and upon certiorari, the Commission's ruling was reversed by the District Court, and the petition was dismissed.
The Commission prosecuted a writ of error to review the decision of the District Court.
Held.-"To sum up, we cannot say-that the Commission was not justified in its findings of fact and its orders and judgment based thereon. We
are not to be understood as saying that the Public Utilities Commission has
unlimited and *unrestricted power in making findings of fact and in entering
orders and decrees. It is sufficient to say in this case that no constitutional
or statutory provisions have been violated by the Commission and that the
evidence before it fully justified the orders which it made, and that the District Court either in a Code writ of certiorari or by the writ of review provided by the Utilities act, if there is any difference between them, was not
justified in its judgment setting aside the orders of the Utilities Commission."

Reversed and remanded.

DICTA
PLEADINGS-AMENDED

COMPLAINT-EFFECT OF-RIGHT TO

FILE-NO. 12297-H. C. Burson vs. J. E. Adamson et al.Decided May 26,1930.
Facts.-This was an action to recover losses sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the alleged fraud, deceit, and conversion of his property by the defendants. The complaint
originally embodied three separate causes of action for the one
wrong. To the complaint, the defendant filed a motion to
make more specific and certain. This motion was allowed
and an order of court was also had to make the plaintiff elect
as to which of the causes of action he would pursue. To the
plaintiff's bill of particulars, the defendant filed a motion to
strike the bill from the files, and to dismiss the complaint because the bill of particulars did not set out the information
which the court required, and for the further reason that the
bill of particulars was a sham pleading. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The defendant moved
to strike the amended complaint on the grounds that the court
had not granted leave to amend, and that the amended complaint was a sham pleading, and also that in no sense did it
comply with the order of the court to make more specific, it
being ambiguous and merely a repetition of the original complaint. The court, thereupon, of its own motion, dismissed
the action without prejudice.
Held.-l. The plaintiff, by compliance with the order
to elect which of his causes of action he would pursue, waived
the adverse ruling on this point. The court, however, infers
that the plaintiff need not have made the election.
2. When the plaintiff complied with the order to make
more specific and certain, he waived any error that might have
existed in granting the order. "All objections to rulings on
motions or demurrers attacking a complaint, except as to jurisdiction and want of facts are waived by answering over."
Williams vs. Smith 76 Colo. 151 and Erisman vs. McCarty
77 Colo. 289, wherein there is announced the doctrine that
error, if any, in overruling a demurrer to a complaint upon
the ground of insufficiency of facts to constitute a cause of
action is waived by answering over, are expressly overruled.
3. By filing his amended complaint, the plaintiff waived

DICTA
error, if there was error, on the part of the court in striking

the bill of particulars.
4. An amended complaint should not be filed without
leave of the court.

Judgment Affirmed.
DELAY-No. 12572-Losasso
vs. People of the State of Colorado-Decided April 7,
1930.
Facts.-Losasso was convicted of statutory rape. The
evidence indicated that the offense was committed in May,
1929, that there was no outcry by the girl, and that the information was not filed until the following October. The
complaining witness testified variously that the offense was
committed May 9, May 16, and April 16. Losasso's counsel
contends that the delay in prosecution and the contradictions
in the testimony so weakened the case of the prosecutor that
the facts are insufficient to support the verdict.
Held.-This was a verdict rendered on conflicting evidence and must stand.
Judgment Affirmed.
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